In this paper, principal component analysis is used to weigh the level of corporate governance and an intermediary effect model is built based on the perspective of corporate governance. It is found that the cash dividend payment propensity and payment level of listed companies with venture capital shareholders are significantly higher than that of listed companies without venture capital holdings, and the higher the shareholding ratio of venture capital to listed companies, the higher the cash dividend payment level. The effect of venture investment on cash dividend is realized by improving corporate governance level. The higher the proportion of venture investment in listed companies, the more obvious the improvement of corporate governance is, thereby reducing the agency cost of the company, which is manifested in the improvement of cash dividend payment level of listed companies.
Introduction
In recent years, China has launched GEM, NEEQ, science and innovation board and other emerging sectors, which have become the preferred targets of venture capital. Therefore, venture capital plays an increasingly important role in China's emerging markets. The reason why dividend policy, especially cash dividend, has become a research hotspot in recent years is that it belongs to the distribution category of enterprise financial management and plays an important role in enterprise capital utilization and enterprise financing behavior. Enterprises send important signals to investors and the public by paying cash dividends, and as an important financial decision, it has an important impact on enterprise cash flow and a number of financial indicators, therefore, it plays an important role in regulating and feedback to the enterprise itself and the whole capital market. Venture capital as an investor's income is divided into two parts, one is dividends, the other is capital gains. No matter which part of the income the venture capital gains, the precondition must be to ensure the continuous operation ability, profitability and development ability of the target company. Venture capital, as a "special shareholder", enters the target company as a governance layer to participate in corporate governance, and uses its team resources and shareholders' rights to improve corporate governance through strengthening supervision, so as to achieve the goal of obtaining excess earnings. Domestic researches on the effect of venture capital on dividend policy ignore the intermediate links, and some researches focus on listed companies on main board or all listed companies. Therefore, in the process of building a more perfect capital market, we need to further uncover the mystery of venture capital and dividend distribution system, so as to correctly guide venture capital into the capital market .And dividend policy in the capital market can send an effective signal, making the capital market normal and effective operation.
Literature Review and Research Hypothesis
On the one hand, Jensen's (1989) research showed that venture capital is a kind of special shareholders, namely "active shareholders", who actively participate in the governance activities of invested companies due to their own interests [1] . Chaopeng Wu et al. (2012) show that companies have excessive investment in free cash flow, and venture capital can reduce such behavior, which indicates that venture capital can reduce the agency cost of free cash flow [2] . The above literature studies show that venture capital has the ability, motivation and willingness to play a role in the invested enterprises and reduce agency costs. To sum up, venture capital participates in corporate governance and reduces agency costs, that is, cash flow can be manipulated by distributing cash dividends to reduce. On the other hand, Fuguang Huang et al. (2013) show that venture capital can help enterprises ease financing constraints due to its particularity [3] . Therefore, venture capital can not only improve corporate governance level and reduce agency cost to influence cash dividends, but also ease financing constraints and increase cash dividends. Therefore, we propose hypothesis 1:Companies with venture capital participation are more likely to pay cash dividends than those without.
And hypothesis 2: the shareholding ratio of venture capital is positively correlated with the cash dividend payment level of the invested company. Hellmann and Puri(2002) showed that venture capital reduced agency problems by firing managers, which enabled managers to devote themselves to serving the company [4] . It can be seen that venture capital participates in corporate governance and restrains managers, thus reducing agency costs. Moreover, based on shareholder activism, venture capital will actively participate in and improve corporate governance in order to improve its own interests. Based on these, we propose hypothesis 3: With the increase of the shareholding ratio of venture capital, the level of corporate governance also increases.
In addition, Xiuqing Zang and Zhixia Cui (2016) showed that ownership concentration can regulate the relationship between cash dividends and agency costs, which will be expressed in the form of cash dividends [5] . Since most investors are supportive of the companies' cash dividend distribution, cash dividend distribution is conducive to reducing the abuse of free cash flow by management. Thus, it can be seen that the improvement of corporate governance level can effectively reduce the agency costs which generated by the separation of power in modern enterprises. That is to say, by improving corporate governance level, reduce managerial discretionary free cash flow, thus the waste of idle funds can be reduced, and the capital efficiency can be improved. Therefore, we propose hypothesis 4: the higher the level of corporate governance, the higher the level of cash dividend payment. And, hypothesis 5: corporate governance plays an intermediary effect in the relationship between venture capital and cash dividend.
Research Design

Sample Selection and Data Sources
In this paper, non-financial listed companies in chinext with A-share from 2015 to 2017 are selected as the initial research samples. Meanwhile, the samples were screened and processed as follows: (1)excluding companies that have been listed for less than a year. (2)excluding companies that have issued B shares or H shares at the same time. After screening, a total of 966 samples were obtained, and the financial data of listed companies were obtained from CSMAR database and RESSET database, etc.
As for the identification of venture capital in the list of top ten shareholders of listed companies, we can determine whether it is venture capital or not through the database query of Zerotech PE. According to the above criteria, 608 venture capital institutions were selected from the total 966 samples of listed companies from 2015 to 2017, that is, 62.94% of the samples of listed companies had venture capital participation. The industry classification standard adopted by China securities regulatory commission.
Variable Definition
Design and Description of Corporate Governance Composite Index
In this paper, eight typical indicators are selected to weigh the level of corporate governance, including the shareholding ratio of largest shareholders (S1), the ratio of the largest shareholder to the sum of the second to tenth shareholders (S2), the proportion of independent directors (PID), the shareholding ratio of senior executives (MH), the separation of two rights (DSP), whether there is a parent company (PC), whether there is a state-owned share (SS) and the size of the board of supervisors (SN). In this paper, the principal component analysis method is adopted to extract the principal component from the eight indicators, and the eigenvalue of the principal component is taken as the weight to construct a corporate governance composite index (CGI) as the substitute variable of corporate governance. In the KMO test, the KMO value is 0.634, and in the Bartlett test, the sig value is 0.000, indicating that the data are not mutually independent and have certain correlation, so it is appropriate to conduct factor analysis. Among them, the eigenvalues of 4 factors were greater than 1, contributing rates were 30.618%, 18.925%, 13.690% and 12.503% respectively, and the cumulative contribution rates were 75.736%.
CGI=30.618%*F1+18.925%*F2+13.690%*F3+12.503%*F4
Empirical Model
To test the mediating effect of corporate governance, OLS regression models were constructed as follows:
Div_dummy The regression results in columns 2 and 4 of Table 2 show that the dummy variable coefficient of venture capital is significantly positive, which indicates that the involvement of venture capital is positively correlated with cash dividend payment tendency and cash dividend payment level. The coefficient is defined as follows: compared with the listed companies without venture capital participation, the dividend payment probability of the listed companies with venture investment participation is 1.6% higher, the dividend per share is 0.024 yuan higher, and the dividend payment rate is 1.9% higher. Therefore, it is shown that when venture capital is shareholder of listed companies, it can have an impact on the companies' cash dividend payment tendency and payment level, and it has a significant positive impact. This conclusion verifies hypothesis 1. In addition, the coefficients reflecting VC sum holding in columns 3 and 5 are also significantly positive. The results show that, among the shareholders of listed companies, the higher the proportion of venture capital participation, the more likely the listed companies are to pay dividends, and it is positively correlated with the level of cash dividend payment. This conclusion verifies hypothesis 2. Note :***, ** and * respectively represent significant at the levels of 1%, 5% and 10%, and the values in brackets represent the P value of the corresponding t-statistic of coefficients. Table 2 examines the relationship between the shareholding ratio of venture capital and corporate governance. The regression coefficient is 1.931 and significant, which indicates that venture capital has a positive promoting effect on corporate governance. This shows that, with the increase of the proportion of venture capital shareholders in listed companies, the level of corporate governance has been improved. This conclusion supports hypothesis 3. Columns 7 and 8 examine the impact of venture capital and corporate governance on cash dividends. As can be seen from the last two columns of table 2 , the corporate governance level (CGI) coefficient is still significantly positive, which indicates that with the improvement of corporate governance level, the agency cost decreases, which shows that companies tend to pay cash dividends and have higher cash dividend payment level. This conclusion supports hypothesis 4. In addition, after the addition of corporate governance variables, the regression coefficient of the shareholding ratio of venture capital is no longer significant, indicating that corporate governance variables replace venture capital variables and directly affect cash dividends, verifying that corporate governance plays an intermediary effect in the relationship between venture capital and cash dividends. This result confirms hypothesis 5, that is, the influence of venture capital on cash dividend is generated through the improvement of corporate governance level, and corporate governance plays an intermediary effect.
Column 6 in
Robustness Test
In order to ensure the robustness of the conclusions in this paper, the robustness test is carried out from the following two parts.
(1)Granger causality test is adopted in this paper to ensure the correctness of the causal relationship between explained variables and explanatory variables. The results prove that venture capital is the reason of cash dividend. Venture capital is the cause of corporate governance; Corporate governance is the cause of cash dividends.
(2) For the test of mediating effect, Goodman test, Aroian test and Sobel test are adopted in this paper, and the specific data are shown in Table 3 . 
Conclusions and Implications
This paper takes 322 listed companies from 2015 to 2017 as samples to analyze and verify the mechanism of venture capital's effect on cash dividends of Gem listed companies. The results show that the listed companies with venture capital are inclined to pay cash dividend, and the level of cash dividend payment is significantly higher. With the increase of the shareholding ratio of venture capital, the propensity and level of cash dividend payment are also significantly higher. Further research also found that venture capital, as a "special shareholder", improves corporate governance level by giving full play to the functions of shareholders and governance layer, thereby affecting the companies' cash dividend.
The research conclusion of this paper has significance both in theory and in practice. First of all, through the analysis and explanation of the mechanism of action, people can better understand the reasons for the contradiction of historical research conclusions. Second, in the past study, part of the study only focused on the effect of venture capital on dividend policy, but do not analyze whether the impact of venture capital on dividend policy is direct or indirect, or whether it exists at the same time. Through the interpretation of the mechanism of action, trying to solve the dividend puzzle of the tip of the iceberg. So this article introduces the corporate governance index, using the mediation effect of test model to analysis the effect mechanism of venture capital on dividend policy, tracing the origin of the relation between venture capital and cash dividend policy of invested company. The conclusion is that the mechanism of the impact of venture capital on dividend policy. The mechanism is to improve corporate governance level and reduce agency costs, which is manifested in the improvement of cash dividend payment level. Therefore, this paper can not only enrich the relevant literature on cash dividend policy, but also play a practical role in guiding venture capital to enter the capital market, improving corporate governance level and designing the cash dividend system of listed companies. To understand the impact of venture capital on cash dividends from the mechanism of action, when faced with different industries and enterprises in different periods, how should regulators guide venture capital has certain enlightenment significance in the capital market. More importantly, how to establish a mature capital market to better protect the interests of small and medium investors, furthermore, serving the entity economy with the power of capital and plays an active role in promoting economic development.
